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The effect of group structure on cooperative behavior is not well understood. In this paper, we study the
dynamics of a public goods game involving n-agent interactions. In the proposed setup, the population is
organized into groups. We associate the individual fitness to group performance, while the evolutionary dynamics
takes place globally. We derive analytical expressions and show that the model exhibits several fixed points,
including the symmetric homogeneous states of total cooperation and total defection, which are unstable
and stable, respectively. Interestingly, even if both individual and group levels are organized as well-mixed
populations, the dynamics displays intermediate values of cooperation under the replicator dynamics. Namely,
as soon as one of the groups, at least, is fully cooperative, intermediary fixed points appear for the rest of
the groups. In addition to the analytical approach, we have performed numerical simulations that reproduce
the internal fixed points obtained theoretically, showing coexisting intermediate levels of cooperation. Potential
implications of these results in terms of group selection and the role of social norms are also discussed.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevE.100.052307
I. INTRODUCTION
Understanding how cooperative behavior emerges in dif-
ferent contexts remains an outstanding question in modern
evolutionary sciences [1,2]. The challenge posed by the obser-
vation of cooperation, when selfish behavior provides higher
fitness, has been studied in many different contexts, from
biology [3,4] to economics [5] and sociology [6]. Several
mechanisms have been proposed to explain this “coopera-
tion dilemma.” Among these, direct [7] and indirect [8,9]
reciprocity rely on the idea that cooperative behavior may
be favored by the likelihood of future interactions. However,
network reciprocity [10] is rooted on the assortative effects
of the topology of individual connections. Other proposals
include kin selection, which refers to cooperation as favoring
the reproductive success of an agent’s relatives, even at a cost
of survival or reproduction of the individual [11], or group
selection, which involves competing groups of individuals.
They, however, have got entangled in the old debate in evo-
lution about multilevel selection, which have left open the
question of the effective replicator: the individual, the group,
the clade, the selfish gene, etc. [12–14].
Although most of the theoretical [15,16] and experimen-
tal [17–19] studies on cooperation have focused on pairwise
interactions, many biological [3], social [5], or economic [6]
systems which are interesting from the perspective of coop-
eration involve n-agent interactions. The public goods game
(PGG) is perhaps one of the simplest, and most studied,
“group interaction” [20] scenarios. In this game, while only
cooperators contribute to the common good, both cooperators
and defectors benefit from it, that is, defectors are free-riders,
social parasites. In the classical formulation of the PGG, for
a constant individual cooperation cost, and a linear bene-
fit function, defection is the rational choice and constitutes
the only Nash equilibrium of the game. However, interior
Nash equilibria can be found for nonlinear convex benefit
functions [21]. Other solutions proposed for the resilience
of cooperation in the evolutionary dynamics of PGG include
structured populations [22,23] or information exchange [24].
In this paper, we investigate in detail how the strategies of
the PGG spread over the population of players under maybe
the simplest possible set of assumptions on the structure of
agent contacts: Agents are partitioned into groups, each group
constituting a fully connected subpopulation within which its
members exploit a common good, the individual fitness of
each agent being a simple function of the abundance of coop-
erators in his group. To implement Darwinian competition for
strategy spreading we use the “well-mixed” myopic replicator
dynamics [25]; i.e., “An agent imitates another, randomly cho-
sen from the whole population, with a probability proportional
to the fitness difference, if positive.” The model is presented
in Sec. II.
In Sec. III we study the mesoscale description leading to
an m-dimensional Markov process describing the evolution
of the fraction of cooperators in each of the m competing
groups. The complete analysis of this dynamical system is
greatly simplified by the use of symmetry arguments, pro-
vided the competing groups are equally sized (a general-
ization to unequal-sized groups is studied in Appendix C).
This method provides metastable macroscopic states, showing
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FIG. 1. Structure of the model. Strategist agents are disposed
in groups and can either cooperate or defect. Agents’ payoffs are
proportional to the number of cooperators in their group, cooperators
having to pay an extra cost. Although agents obtain their payoffs
from their group, imitation takes place from any group. In the
diagram, solid red arrows represent the cooperation invasion flows,
and blue dashed arrows the defection flows. See the text for further
details.
intermediate levels of cooperation, for a subset of initial
conditions, namely, when a group is composed exclusively by
cooperators. Section IV is devoted to present results agents’
stochastic simulations, which show a long term behavior in
which the group cooperation values fluctuate around some
well defined values, accurately predicted by the Markov dy-
namics analyzed in the previous section. Finally, in Sec. V we
discuss the implications of the model in terms of social norms,
group selection, and sustainability of the common good, and
present our conclusions.
II. THE MODEL
This is a simple model of evolutionary game dynamics,
where a population of strategists play a PGG, from where they
earn their reproductive power, i.e., their fitness. A population
of N = m × n agents is divided into m groups, each one with
n agents (Fig. 1). Inside each group, the agents play a public
goods game with two possible strategies: cooperate (C) and
defect (D). Let us denote by f Cg and f Dg the payoff earned,
respectively, by a cooperator and a defector in the group g
(=1, . . . , m). If cg is the number of cooperators in group g and
the individual contribution to the public good is fixed to 1,
then these payoffs are, in the standard linear PGG,
f Cg =
rcg
n
− 1, f Dg =
rcg
n
, (1)
where the slope r > 1 of the payoff is often called “synergy
factor.” The fitness of an individual is assumed to be propor-
tional to his payoff. Equations (1) can be rewritten as
f Cg = r pg − 1, f Dg = r pg, (2)
where pg is the fraction of cooperator agents in group g.
To implement the Darwinian competition for strategic
reproduction/spread, we choose the discrete version of the
myopic replicator dynamics [25,26]. On one hand, its con-
tinuum limit for pairwise games is, straightaway [25], the
well-studied replicator equation [27]. On the other hand, its
threshold character, see Eq. (3) below, i.e., “never change state
by imitation of a less fit agent,” turns out to be a source of
simplicity in the analysis, as we will see below.
The idea of this model is pretty clear, namely, fitness
comes from the group, while imitation takes place anywhere.
Specifically, at each time step, which represents one gener-
ation of the discrete evolutionary time, all the agents play a
one-shot PGG and obtain a payoff. After that, the individuals
synchronously update their strategies in the following way:
each agent i compares its payoff with that of a random agent
j chosen equiprobably from any group, including its own.
Subsequently, if agent j has a lower payoff than agent i,
it keeps his/her strategy, while if it is higher i imitates j’s
strategy with a probability  j→i proportional to the payoff
difference:
 j→i = f
j − f i
 fmax θ ( f
j − f i ), (3)
where θ is the Heaviside step function (θ (y) = 1 for y > 0
and θ (y) = 0 for y  0), and  fmax is defined as the maximal
possible difference in payoff. Note that, in this model, the
fitness is given directly by the payoff, both quantities being
equal. The highest payoff is the one of a single defector in
a group of cooperators or the one of a cooperator in a fully
cooperative group (depending on the value of r), if all other
groups are 100% defectors. Besides, if all groups consist of
cooperators only, except one formed by defectors but one
cooperator, then the latter has the lowest payoff in the whole
population. Additionally, we have that
 fmax = f Di (cg = n − 1) − f Cj (ch = 1), if r  n,
 fmax = f Ci (cg = n) − f Cj (ch = 1), if r > n, (4)
where cg (respectively, ch) stands for the number of coop-
erators in the group to which i ( j) belongs. The value of
 fmax determines the characteristic time scale. Note that for
the simplest partition, where the game is played by all agents
altogether, i.e., m = 1, one realizes easily from Eq. (1) that
the extinction of the cooperative strategy is the only possible
evolutionary outcome. Free-riding is an unbeatable strategy.
III. MARKOV PHASE SPACE ANALYSIS
In this section we will consider equal-sized groups of n
individuals. As there is no networked structure of agents
interactions, neither regarding imitation rule nor inside groups
regarding payoff earning, the fraction of cooperators in each
group pg (g = 1, . . . , m) specify the relevant instantaneous
description of the system’s state of cooperation. However,
note that if the term microstate refers to the specification of
the particular state of each agent, and these are distinguishable
individuals, then each particular set of values of pg represents
a different number of microstates.
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FIG. 2. Phase portrait for the two-groups case. A red dot in-
dicates an unstable fixed point, a black dot a stable one, and a
blue dot indicates a saddle point. The green lines correspond to
the f C1 = f D2 and f D1 = f C2 singularities. The green dots correspond
to the points (1, pth2 ) and (pth1 , 2). Gray (respectively, purple) lines
correspond to nullclines d p1 = 0 (d p2 = 0), while arrows represent
the trajectories. Here, r = 4. See the text for further details.
The phase space is a grid, with lattice constant 1/n, over
the m-dimensional unit hypercube. The stochastic population
dynamics introduced in Sec. II defines a Markov process in
this phase space, the model dynamics.
We show below the analysis of the model dynamics for
the simplest cases, say m = 2 (Sec. III A) and 3 (Sec. III B),
through a detailed geometrical investigation. The arguments
used in the analysis of these explicitly solvable cases, are how-
ever easily seen to be valid for general values of the number
m of groups involved. We take advantage of the simplicity
that permutation symmetry considerations introduce in the
analysis of the general m case in Sec. III C.
In Sec. IV stochastic simulation results are interpreted in
the light of the previous nonlinear phase space analysis.
A. Two groups
Here, our phase space is the unit square. For equal-sized
groups, the invariance by interchange of group label (meaning
that nothing at all changes if labels 1 and 2 are interchanged
everywhere) allows us to restrict attention to the triangle
0  p2  p1  1. It is simple to realize that the flow points
outwards nowhere on the triangle boundary. Notwithstanding
this invariance, we will show in the illustrating Fig. 2 a “full”
phase space portrait where this symmetry, at a first glance, can
be easily acknowledged.
The stochastic dynamics defined in the previous section
above for the agents’ state evolution gives the following prob-
abilities for the four possible relevant outcomes of the time
step, say, increase or decrease of the number of cooperators
in either group. Let P+i be the probability of the transition
pi → pi + 1/n, (i = 1, 2), and P−i the probability the proba-
bility of the transition pi → pi − 1/n. These probabilities are
functions of the fractions pi of cooperators:
P+1 = 0,
P−1 =
p1
τ
[(1 − p1) + (1 − p2)( f D2 − f C1 ) θ( f D2 − f C1 )],
P+2 =
1 − p2
τ
p1
( f C1 − f D2 ) θ( f C1 − f D2 ),
P−2 =
p2
τ
[(1 − p1)( f D1 − f C2 )+ (1 − p2)], (5)
where τ is the characteristic time scale (here, τ = 2 fmax). In
the previous formulas, we have considered that f Di − f Ci =
1. Note that, by imposing the condition p2  p1, we are
introducing an asymmetry between P+1 and P
+
2 also between
P−1 and P
−
2 . The flow on this (p1, p2) unit square is (i = 1, 2)
d pi = 1
n
(P+i − P−i ). (6)
First we locate the nullclines, d pi = 0, on the triangle.
1. d p1 = 0. This locus includes the corners (0,0) and (1,1),
and the segment of the edge p1 = 1 of p2 values for which
f C1 > f D2 . The conditions f C1 = f D2 and p1 = 1 determine the
upper bound, pth2 , of this branch of nullcline:
pth2 =
√
1 + 4r(r − 1) − 1
2r
. (7)
Note that for p2 > pth2 , d p1 < 0, and the flow on the edge
points inwards, while for 0  p2 < pth2 , the Heaviside func-
tion vanishes and the flow is colinear to the edge (a cooperator
in group 1 does not imitate defectors in group 2).
2. d p2 = 0. This includes the corners (0,0) and (1,1), and
two branches. The first branch is the segment 0  p1  1/r
on the edge p2 = 0. The second branch is interior to the
simplex, and its graph connects the points (1/r, 0) and (1, p∗2),
where p∗2 is explicitly computed as
p∗2 =
r − 1
r + 1 . (8)
We see that this nullcline shows a singularity at p1 = 1/r.
Due to the Heaviside θ functions in Eq. (5), there is a line of
singularities of the flow field, namely, the intersection of the
locus f C1 = f D2 with the simplex. This is a curve connecting
the points (1/r, 0) and (1, pth2 ), where the constant-d p2 iso-
clines show a singular behavior, similar to that of the d p2 = 0
nullcline, that we have seen above.
The stationary states of the phase space flow have to be
in the intersection of the nullclines. Thus, there are three fixed
points (0,0), (1,1), and (1, p∗2). To determine the stability prop-
erties of these fixed points, one should first compute the flow’s
Jacobian matrices at them, whose spectral decompositions
inform us on their stability against perturbations in the linear
regime.
The (i, j) Jacobian matrix’s element, expresses how a
variation in p j , in the linear approximation, modifies d pi, i.e.,
it is
Ji j = ∂d pi
∂ p j
,
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and the results of the spectral analysis of the Jacobian matrix
at the three fixed points (see Appendix A for details) can be
summarized as follows:
(0,0) Both eigenvalues are negative, as any fluctuation is
damped out. Thus, complete defection is a local attractor. In
fact, it is the global attractor for any initial condition in the
interior of the simplex.
(1,1) Both eigenvalues are positive, meaning that coopera-
tion in both groups is a repeller fixed point. Any perturbation
(the appearance of a defector in either group) is amplified.
(1, p∗2) This is always a saddle point. Its stable manifold is
the branch of the d p1 = 0 nullcline, the segment 0  p2 < pth2
on the edge. The unstable linear manifold is tangent to the
interior branch of the d p2 = 0 nullcline. In Fig. 2, the saddle
(p1 = 1, p2 = p∗2) is represented by a blue dot, and the upper
point of the d p1 = 0 nullcline, (p1 = 1, p2 = pth2 ) by a green
dot.
Figure 2 displays the phase portrait for r = 2, where previ-
ous results can be checked by simple inspection.
B. Three groups
While we analyze here the case m = 3, we also keep an
eye on general m values, because several conclusions from
this analysis are easily seen to remain valid for an arbitrary
large number of groups in the system.
The set of microstates is the unit cube. One easily realizes
that the fully defective corner (0,0,0) is a fixed point of the
dynamics. Also, it is easily seen that any small increase from
zero in the fraction of cooperators in one or more groups,
induces a restoring flow. Full defection is an absorbing state,
an attractor. However, the other fully symmetric corner, the
full cooperation corner, (1,1,1) is also a fixed point, but it is
unstable against defective fluctuations in one or more groups,
and then is a repeller. The main diagonal connecting both, i.e.,
the set of fully symmetric states, is a flow trajectory of strictly
decreasing value of cooperation in every group. Indeed, after a
little reflection, all this is true mutatis mutandi for any value of
m  2. In any dimension m of the phase space, the set of fully
symmetric microstates is invariant, and moreover, any small
fluctuation orthogonal to it induces a restoring flow.
The remaining six corners of the unit cube are not fixed
points, for at least one group is full defective, and at least
another one is full cooperative, and then a flow of increasing
fraction of cooperators in the full defective group is ensured.
Also this argument applies independently of the value of m.
Now we look for eventual fixed points on the twelve edges
of the unit cube. Due to the symmetry by labels interchange,
they are grouped into three classes of equivalence, which
correspond to invariant subsets under symmetry transforma-
tions:
1. The three axes are an invariant set under symmetry
transformations. To fix ideas, think of the p3 axis, at an
abscissa 0 < p3. The components of the flow orthogonal to
this axis are both positive, thus we conclude that the are no
fixed points on the axes other than the attractor at origin. Note
that this was already clear for the two-groups case; it is easy
to realize that it is true for any number m of groups involved.
2. The six cube edges that are neither adjacent to the origin
nor to the (1,1,1) corner [e.g., the segment (0, p2, 1)] form
the second equivalence class. In these microstates (points in
these axes) there is one fully defective group and the flow is
nonnull due to the zero payoff of its defectors. Let us note that
this simple consideration leads also to the conclusion that the
three faces of the unit cube adjacent to origin cannot have on
them a fixed point other than the origin.
3. The three cube edges adjacent to the full cooperation
corner, say the segments (p1, 1, 1), (1, p2, 1) and (1, 1, p3),
form the third class of edges. To fix ideas, think of, e.g.,
(1, p2, 1). For values of p2 large enough, defectors in group
2 have larger payoff than cooperators in the fully cooperative
groups 1 and 3, and there, the flow points toward the interior
of the unit cube. If we denote by pth the value of p2 for which
f D2 = f C1 = f C3 , and p1 = p3 = 1, i.e.,
pth = r + 1
2r
(√
1 + 8r(r − 1)(r + 1)2 − 1
)
, (9)
then the segment 0  p2  pth is an invariant set; in other
words, there the flow is colinear to the edge. Clearly, d p2 > 0
at p2 = 0, while at p2 = pth (where f D2 = f C1 = f C3 ) intra-
group imitation leads to d p2 < 0. Thus, there is a fixed point
0 < pˆ < pth inside the segment, where the nullcline surface
d p2 = 0 intersects the edge (1, p2, 1).
To proceed in the search for fixed points located at the
phase space boundary, we have finally to consider the three
faces adjacent to the fully cooperative corner (1,1,1), which
form a class of equivalent faces. To allow for analytics, we
explicitly consider one of these, say, the face defined by p3 =
1, and, due to the symmetry by interchange of labels 1 and 2,
we focus attention onto the triangular simplex p2  p1, as in
Sec. III A.
Note that we have already inferred the existence of a fixed
point (1, pˆ, 1) located at the edge. The replicator dynamics
defines the flow Eq. (6) on it with the following transition
probabilities (where τ is the characteristic time scale, here
τ = 3 fmax):
P+3 = 0,
P−3 =
1
τ
[∑
i=1,2
(1 − pi )
( f Di − f C3 ) θ( f Di − f C3 )
]
,
P+1 =
1 − p1
τ
( f C3 − f D1 ) θ( f C3 − f D1 ),
P−1 =
p1
τ
[(1 − p1) + (1 − p2)( f D2 − f C1 ) θ( f D2 − f C1 )],
P+2 =
1 − p2
τ
[( f C3 − f D2 ) θ( f C3 − f D2 )
+ p1
( f C1 − f D2 ) θ( f C1 − f D2 )],
P−2 =
p2
τ
[(1 − p2) + (1 − p1)( f D1 − f C2 ) θ( f D1 − f C2 )].
(10)
First we determine the region defined by P−3 = 0 (equiv-
alently, f D1 < f C3 ), where the flow remains on the face. The
condition f D1 = f C3 defines a line p˜1(p2) which intersects the
edge (p1, 0, 1) at p˜1(0), and the symmetry line (p, p, 1) at
p˜1(p2 = p1). Note that the condition f D2 < f C3 is also satisfied
due to our restriction to the p2  p1 triangle. The exact
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analytical expression p˜(q), for the borderline p˜1(p2) is
p˜(q) = 1 + rq
2r
[√
1 + 4r(r − 1)(1 + q)(1 + qr)2 − 1
]
, (11)
from which the previous intersection ( p˜(0), p˜( p˜), and pth =
p˜(1)) points can be explicitly determined as functions of the
model parameters.
Only to the left of this line the flow remains on the plane
p3 = 1. We then see that the invariant segment on the vertical
edge, including the fixed point (1, pˆ, 1), is disconnected from
this region. On the contrary, the segment of the symmetry
line below p˜1(p2 = p1) is an invariant set included in the
region, where we now focus attention. At the lower bound
(0,0,1) of this segment the flow is positive, while at the
upper one ( p˜1, p˜1, 1), cooperators in groups 1 and 2 imitate
defectors, thus the flow is negative. Thus, there is a fixed point
(p∗, p∗, 1) inside this segment where the nullcline surface
d p2 = 0 intersects the symmetry line. Note that as this line
invariant, the condition d p2 = 0 entails that also d p1 = 0. In
fact, the intersection of the d p1 = 0 nullcline with the face
has two isolated points, namely, (1,1,1) and (p∗, p∗, 1), and
the segment (1, 0  p2  pth, 1), which is isolated from the
region P−3 = 0.
We have found, regarding stationary states, that besides the
attractor (0,0,0) and the repellor (1,1,1), there are six saddle
fixed points:
1. Three of them are located on the three cube edges
adjacent to (1,1,1), at pˆ; each of them has a stable manifold
on the segment [0, pth] over the corresponding edge; it is clear
that fluctuations along directions orthogonal to the edge are
repelled away the fixed point, so that its unstable manifold is
two-dimensional.
2. The last three fixed points are located at the symmetry
lines of the three faces adjacent to (1,1,1). The stable manifold
for each of them is a two-dimensional (see top panel of
Fig. 3 compact piece of the corresponding face. A fluctuation
orthogonal to the face flows away, along the one-dimensional
unstable manifold.
The three-dimensional visualization of the flow in the 3D
phase space is dominated by the contraction of the interior
phase space toward the fully defective state. However, located
on three of the faces, there are codimension 1 invariant sets
that are the stable manifolds of stationary states where one of
the groups is fully cooperator, and the other two keep the same
mixed state of strategic population. Also, located on the three
cube edges, there are codimension 2 invariant segments that
are the stable manifolds of stationary states with two full-C
groups. We have arrived to these results through the use of
exact and generalizable arguments.
C. Is more (groups) different?
The characterization of the deterministic trajectories in
the phase space of our Markov model carried out for m =
2 and 3 in the previous subsections was obtained through
arguments that are easily seen to hold for general values of
m  2, provided the m groups are equally sized, and thus
the symmetry by label interchange is preserved. Thus, the
following educated conjecture can be safely put forward:
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FIG. 3. Three-groups case. (a) Representation of the unit cube
(p1, p2, p3). Colored areas correspond to the planar regions, codi-
mension 1 stable manifolds, where one of the three groups is fully
cooperator. (b) Phase portrait for the three-groups case restricted to
the plane p3 = 1. The white area is the basin of the full defection
state, while blue area corresponds to the stable manifold. The green
lines correspond to the f C1 = f D2 and f D1 = f C2 singularities, blue
lines to the nullclines, and arrows to trajectories. Inner black dot
corresponds to the fixed point (p∗, p∗, 1), and black dots located on
the coordinate axes correspond to the fixed points ( pˆ, 1, 1), (1, pˆ, 1).
In this plot, r = 4. See the text for further details.
C1 Let n f be any integer such that 1  n f  m − 1, n f
representing the number of groups that are full-C. For any
value of n f there are a finite number saddle fixed points given
by the combinatorial Cmn f , where n f groups are full-C, and
the rest (m − n f ) groups are mixed groups with a fraction of
cooperators p = pˆ(n f , m). These states are equivalent under
label interchange. Any of them has a codimension n f stable
manifold, which corresponds to dimension m − n f .
Note that the value of pˆ(n f = 1, m = 2) was computed in
Sec. III A as Eq. (8), while in Sec. III B, we denoted by pˆ what
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in this general notation is pˆ(n f = 2, m = 3), and by p∗ what
is now termed pˆ(n f = 1, m = 3).
The replicator dynamics is given by
P+i =
n f∑
j=1
(1 − pi )
( f Cj − f Di )θ[( f Cj − f Di )]
m fmax ,
P−i =
m∑
j=n f
pi(1 − p j )
( f Dj − f Ci )θ[( f Dj − f Ci )]
m fmax . (12)
To obtain the value of pˆ(n f , m), we can express the fixed
point condition as
m∑
i=1
P+i =
m∑
i=1
P−i . (13)
The function pˆ(n f , m) can be obtained, by substituting
Eqs. (2) and (12) into the fixed point condition Eq. (13), as the
positive solution (provided it is less than 1) to the quadratic
equation,
ap2 + bp + c = 0, (14)
with coefficients
a = (m − n f )
(
m
n f
+ r − 1
)
,
b = m − (r − 1)(m − 2n f ),
c = −(r − 1)n f .
One can quickly check that this result reproduces Eq. (8)
for m = 2 and n f = 1. No cooperator in the full-C groups
will become a defector as long as its payoff is higher than the
payoff of a defector in one of the “mixed-state” groups. From
this consideration, one easily finds a lower bound pth(m, n f )
for the “fluctuation size” of the full-C groups. The value of this
lower bound, below which stability is ensured, is the positive
root of the quadratic equation,
a′ p2 + b′ p + c′ = 0, (15)
with coefficients
a′ = (m − n f )r,
b′ = (2n f − m)r + (m − n f ),
c′ = −(r − 1)n f .
This provides the exact functional dependence of our lower
bound of instability threshold pth on all model parameters:
m, n f , and r. In the same way, Eq. (14) provides the exact
functional dependence of the mixed cooperation level pˆ on
these parameters.
The mechanism that keeps a rather high average level
of the groups is the positive contribution to P+j , for mixed
groups j, from the imitation of full-C group members. It
follows that there has to exist, at least, a full-C group for
cooperation to persist. Therefore, this mechanism is fragile,
for there is an instability threshold for fluctuations of the
mixed groups cooperation, quantified by pth, which restricts
the stable manifolds of the fixed points to compact subsets on
(m − n f )-dimensional hypercubes. We will pay due attention
to this fragility in Sec. IV.
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FIG. 4. Ground and upper fixed points. The graphs show the
theoretical values of pˆ (solid blue line) and pup (dashed orange line)
as a function of r. The number of groups has been fixed to m = 6,
and the number of full-C groups to nf = 1. See the text for further
details.
In the states that the conjecture C1 refers to, there are
groups with two different values for the fraction of coop-
erators, and one wonders if more than two values for pg
are allowed in a fixed point. We now provide an argument
supporting that “more (groups) is different” [28], regarding
the fixed points of the Markov dynamics. More precisely, we
will argue below that
C2 There are metastable fixed points where groups with
more than two different values of group cooperation pg
coexist.
Consider one of the (type C1) stationary states with n f
groups at the level p = 1 and (m − n f ) groups at the ground
level p = pˆ. Now, choose one (the focal group, now on) of
these latter groups, and change its fraction of cooperators to a
value pup > pˆ, such that:
1. pup < pth. This condition ensures that this change has
no influence on the n f groups in the full c level.
2. pup is high enough to make impossible the imitation by
cooperators in the focal group of defectors in ground groups.
3. The number m of groups is large enough to render very
small the effects of the focal group on the equilibrium value
of the ground level.
From the last two assumptions, one determines (see
Appendix B) an analytical expression for pup as a function
of pˆ and model parameters. Provided this value satisfies the
first item above, this state can be taken as initial condition for
the numerical direct integration of the Markov dynamics as a
check of our third assumption, that hopefully refine both, pup
and pˆ, values. The results of the numerical direct integration
are shown in Fig. 4.
The observations (that are quite generic, regarding vari-
ation of parameters) fully support the existence of fixed
points with three levels of group cooperation, as well as its
metastable character (see Sec. IV).
For a large number m of groups, there is no apparent reason
that can forbid the existence of metastable fixed points with
ν > 3 levels of cooperation, at least for some range of model
parameters and occupancies of the ν levels, provided the full
cooperation level is not empty. Whenever two given levels are
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known, the condition that cooperators in the upper level have
a higher payoff than free-riders in the lower level groups fixes
a threshold value, below which a new intermediate level of
cooperation can be proved for metastability.
We see how, in this model case, “more” groups gives
new kinds of metastable fixed points, by further breaking
the permutation symmetry, and then “is different” [28]. We
should at this point emphasize that all the fixed points we
have found along this Sec. III, other than “all groups are full-C
or full-D,” are only invariant under a proper subset of group
permutations. In other words, all of them are “symmetry-
breaking” states. Also, all of them have at least one group of
full cooperation.
IV. AGENT-BASED STOCHASTIC SIMULATIONS:
FINITE GROUP SIZE FLUCTUATIONS
AND PARAMETRIC SENSITIVITY
In the previous sections we have analyzed the dynamics of
the Markov model. This is different from, although intended
to mimic, the stochastic dynamics of agents that was a part
of the model formal definition in Sec. II. Indeed, the Markov
dynamics is the mesoscopic description. The m fractions pg
are group variables, while any microstate of the system of
agents is really specified by m × n binary values (C or D).
The number μ of agent microstates that are associated to a
point {pg} (g = 1, · · · , m) in the Markov phase space is
μ({pg}) = mg=1
(
n
npg
)
,
defining a nonuniform measure on the m-dimensional
Markov phase space, which is highly concentrated at inter-
mediate values of the group cooperation. When a stochastic
evolution from an initial agent microstate is visualized as a
trajectory on the mesoscopic phase space, large amounts of
information are lost.
Also, while the Markov dynamics is deterministic, the up-
dating of agents strategy is stochastic. Boundaries in Markov
phase space that keep deterministic trajectories inside invari-
ant regions are easily crossed by stochastic trajectories.
A convenient representation for trajectories of the many
groups system is simply provided by the m graphs for pg(t )
(g = 1, · · · , m). In Fig. 5 we show the time evolution of
the fraction of cooperators into the groups for two repre-
sentative realizations corresponding to different group sizes,
n = 200 (top) and n = 1000 (bottom), together with the theo-
retical values of pˆ and pup. As shown, the level of cooperation
in the groups oscillates around points pˆ and pup. This fact is
clearly displayed in Fig. 6, which represents the histogram of
the fraction of cooperative agents into the different groups, af-
ter the transient period and accumulated over 100 independent
realizations, for the same values than those used in the upper
panel of Fig. 5.
The synergy factor r allows the agents to get a higher
payoff for the same contribution, and helps enhancing the co-
operators over the defectors. By increasing r, a given strategy
yields a higher payoff for the same cooperation frequency,
eventually allowing a cooperator in a group with cooperative
population nC + x to beat a defector in a group with cooper-
ative population nC ; it substantially helps the cooperation to
FIG. 5. Stochastic evolution of the system. The graphs show the
time evolution of the fractions of cooperators for two representative
realizations of the six-groups case, each solid line corresponding to
a group. Dotted lines correspond to the theoretical predictions for
pˆ and pup. (a) For small group sizes (N = 200) fluctuations allow
groups to exchange their levels of cooperation. (b) For larger group
sizes (N = 1000) one group clearly detaches from the rest to occupy
the upper fixed point, and the fluctuations are not large enough to
allow exchange. In these plots, r = 6.
maintain itself in a many-groups setup. In general, a full-C
group can resist invasion by defectors if r > n. In that case,
a single defector in a group of size n, which would earn the
highest payoff a defector could expect, would still receive a
payoff lower than cooperator in a full-C cooperator. For r > n,
a group reaching full cooperation will not leave this state,
as long as the fluctuations are not large enough to allow the
system to escape from that state.
It is interesting to look at the fluctuations to infer whether
cooperation is sustainable or not in this setup. As expected
and shown in Fig. 5, fluctuations decay as the population
size increases. For high enough values of n, the system is
stable; the fluctuations around the fixed point do not allow
a defector to beat a cooperator in the fully cooperative group,
and cooperation is maintained. This remained true even for
values of r of the order of n: Indeed, the higher the synergy
factor, the less likely it becomes for a full-C cooperator to
turn into a defector. We argue, by contrast, that finite-size
effects can be dramatic: In some cases (typically n ≈ 10),
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FIG. 6. Histogram of cooperation level in groups. The histogram
counts the number of groups having a certain cooperation rate after
200 time steps. The counts have been accumulated over 100 inde-
pendent realizations. Dashed (respectively, dotted) line corresponds
to the theoretical predictions for pˆ (pup). Here, the parameters are
assigned the same values as in the upper panel of Fig. 5: m = 6,
r = 6, and N = 200. The initial cooperation rates in the non full-C
groups are given by a Gaussian determined by μ = σ 2 = n/4.
the fluctuations around the fixed point might allow a group
to reach and overcome the critical population level, allowing
invasion of the full-C group by defectors; the system cannot
be considered stable anymore in this case. Actually, the fluc-
tuations follow the inverse square root of the population size
(from simulations 1/2√n), which gives us an estimate of the
robustness of the system as a function of the size of the groups.
V. DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY
In this study, we have taken a public goods approach to
understand cooperative behavior in group-structured popu-
lations. In the proposed model, individuals are located in
groups. The fitness of the individuals is related to their group
performance, whereas the imitation takes place globally, that
is, agents have a global vision and can imitate the most
successful behaviors. We have shown that cooperation is
maintained by a homogeneous group of cooperators. Note that
this fully cooperative group does not necessarily have to be
related to a physical group, but a social norm. In this sense, an
interpretation of that group lies in the idea that cooperation
in human societies is mainly based on social norms, and
therefore the sustainability of the commons will be driven
by these norms. For example, the legal enforcement of rules
and the subsequent punishments, usually lie on a consensus
about their legitimacy, that is, on the fact that those rules are
backed by social norms [29]. The existence of a cooperative
social norm [30] can be interpreted as a nonnull probability of
cooperation, which in the proposed model is mathematically
equivalent to a homogeneous group of cooperators. This so-
cial norm can be based either on moral principles or driven by
both empirical and normative expectations [31–33].
The model is analytically solved through a Markovian
approach, showing the existence of inner equilibria, invariant
manifolds and thresholds for metastability. It is worth noting
that although both individual and group levels are based on the
well-mixed approach, the model exhibits intermediate rates
of cooperation under the replicator dynamics. Furthermore,
agent-based stochastic simulations show group cooperation
values fluctuating around the fixed points predicted by the
Markov dynamics, numerically validating the analytical pre-
dictions. Finally, this study has implications on the effect of
social norms and group selection on the sustainability of the
commons.
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APPENDIX A: JACOBIAN FOR THE TWO-GROUPS CASE
In this Appendix we present the general expression of
the four terms of the Jacobian and the computation for J22
evaluated around the fixed point. Let us set F1 = f D2 − f C1 and
F2 = f D1 − f C2 . From Eqs. (5) and (6), it follows:
J11 = p1 − (1 − p2)
[
F1 + p1
(
∂ (F1)
∂ p1
)]
θ (F1),
J12 = p1
[
(1 − p2)∂ (F1)
∂ p2
− F1
]
θ (F1),
J21 = (1 − p2)
[
F1 + p1 ∂ (F1)
∂ p1
]
θ (−F1)
− F2 + (1 − p1)∂ (F2)
∂ p1
,
J22 = p1
[
(1 − p2) ∂F1
∂ p2
− F1
]
θ (−F1) − (1 − p1)F2
− (1 − p2) − p2
[
(1 − p1) ∂F2
∂ p2
]
.
J22 value can be evaluated around the fixed point p∗ com-
puted in Eq. (8):
J22 = 2r
(
r + 1
r − 1 − 1
)
,
which is always negative for r  0.
APPENDIX B: ESTIMATION OF THE UPPER
FIXED POINT
In this Appendix we estimate the value of the metastable
fixed point pup discussed in point C2 of Sec. III C. Let us
consider more than two groups m > 2 and, at least, one full-C
group and more than one mixed groups 1  n f  m − 1).
The polynomial equation for the population in the upper fixed
point pup is found by imposing C2 conditions in the replicator
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dynamics, which drastically reduces the P− term and thus
results in a higher value for the cooperation frequency:
e(pup)2 + gpup + h = 0, (B1)
with
e = nup
(
nup
n f
+ r
)
,
g = α(n f + nˆ pˆ) − (r − 1)nup,
h = (1 − r)(s + nˆ pˆ),
where nˆ and pˆ represent the number of groups in the lowest
fixed point and their cooperation frequency, respectively, and
nup and pup represent the number of groups in the upper fixed
point and their cooperation frequency. After a first estimation
of those values based on the assumption that the variation
of the ground value pˆ is small, a better characterization of
the fixed points can be obtained by refining the values of
the fixed points and of the mean cooperation iteratively until
convergence. The final value of the mean cooperation in
mixed groups p¯ is given by
p¯ = n
up pup + (m − n f − nup) pˆ
m − n f . (B2)
Since it is possible to compute the value of the mean
cooperation frequency in the general case, we can compute
the upper limit pth allowed for sustainability of cooperation.
Let f fC be the fitness of a cooperator in the full-C group, andf thD be the fitness of a defector in the pth group. From the limit
condition,
f fC = f thD , (B3)
it follows
pthr = (r − 1), pth = 1 − 1
r
. (B4)
If in a group the cooperation frequency overcomes this
value, then cooperators in the fully cooperative group can
turn into defectors and the system would be in the basin of
attraction of the fully defective state.
APPENDIX C: UNEQUAL-SIZED GROUPS
An interesting way toward the generalization of this model
is to introduce disparity in groups sizes. Note that, considering
that all the agents have the same probability to be chosen for
imitation, larger groups will be more influential than smaller
ones. This asymmetry may allow defectors in large groups to
invade small cooperative groups.
As in the case of equal group sizes, without a fully coop-
erative group, the system is in the basin of attraction of the
full-defection state.
Since the imitation probabilities depend on the size of each
group, the probabilities for a group i to increase and decrease
its fraction of cooperators pi by 1/ni become, respectively,
P+i =
ni(1 − pi )
τ
m∑
j = 1
j = i
n j p j
( f Cj − f Di ) θ( f Cj − f Di ),
P−i =
ni pi
τ
m∑
j=1
n j p j
( f Dj − f Ci ) θ( f Dj − f Ci ), (C1)
where ni represents the total number of agents of group i, N
represents the total number of agents in the whole system, and
τ is the characteristic time scale involving  fmax and N .
The expression for the fixed point p∗ corresponding to all
the mixed groups (non full-C groups) sharing the same value
pi is obtained by setting P+i = P−i :
(N − n f )2 p∗(1 − p∗) = n f (N − n f )(1 − p∗)(r − p∗r),
(C2)
which yields the value of the fixed point:
p∗ = n f (r − 1)
N − n f . (C3)
A full-C group will resist invasion by defectors if
f fC > f gD ⇒
r − 1
r
> p∗gng, (C4)
where ng represents the size of the biggest group, excluding
the full-C group.
Condition Eq. (C4) relates the size of the fully cooperative
group, the size of the biggest mixed group and the synergy
factor r. It expresses whereas the full-C group can survive,
and therefore, whether cooperation is stable in such a system
or not.
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